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If the line of reasoning expressed in the Shelley case is adopted, the
neighborhood school system which results in segregated schools will be
held to deprive Negroes of equal protection of the law. However, in order
to utilize the reasoning of Shelley, one must show private discrimination
within the residential area, reflected in the districting of the schools. In
order to do this one would have to change the social make-up of the com-
munity, for not all residential areas are based on racial discrimination.
Many factors are considered by the individual in establishing a home, not
the least of which is cost. In the same manner, many factors may properly
be considered by school boards in the creation of school zones.
Since the neighborhood school system is deeply rooted in our American
heritage, it would seem that the better solution is to allow redefining of
school districts along more balanced racial lines, taking into account the
reality of the neighborhood situation, rather than declaring school zones
unconstitutional when race is used as one factor in their delineation. This
is the California approach.
The basic problem facing the state legislatures is to provide the best
possible education for every citizen, and the legislatures should be granted
wide discretion in their attempts to attain this goal. Positive legislation,
using race as one criterion, is both realistic and necessary. Although there
may not be a duty to integrate, this must be distinguished from the state
legislatures' right to affirmatively act towards bringing about integration.
William B. Freilich
MONEY PAYMENT REQUIREMENTS AS CONDITIONS




Today's residential developer is being faced with the necessity of
complying with sometimes questionable and often costly demands by local
authorities as a condition to the approval of his subdivision maps and
* This comment was prepared in furtherance of the program of, and with material
assistance from, the Communities Research Institute in the School of Law, Villanova
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plans.' These demands, which have been multiplying in number and
variety, threaten to increase the developer's costs without adding to the
market value of his product. This has proved particularly bothersome
to the contemporary builder who has turned to larger scale operations in
order to pare costs and to bring housing within the reach of a wider circle
of potential home buyers, consequently becoming highly cost conscious
and worrying lest his product be priced out of the market.
Building codes, zoning and subdivision controls all directly affect the
builder's operations and limit his flexibility and independence in a way
not paralleled in any other industry not a public utility. Since most of
the regulation is imposed and supervised by local government units, the
requirements vary widely from locality to locality according to the discre-
tion of planning commissions, zoning boards and building inspectors.2
A particularly recent, but apparently rapidly growing, innovation in the
field of land development controls has been to demand money payments
as a condition to the approval for filing subdivision maps or plans. It is
unquestionable that the increase in population attending land development
in a community results in a corresponding increase in the expense of
providing public services, such as roads, sewage disposal, schools, police
and fire protection. Within limits, the developer may be required to bear
a share of this increased cost, but there is a danger of abuse if local govern-
ment officials incline toward making the new inhabitants bear more than
a fair share. This is often a likelihood, rather than a mere possibility since
the officials are members of the local population which would otherwise
have to share the cost. Because the interested parties will resort to the
courts to delineate proper and improper use of money payment demands,
it is anticipated that this will become one of the important local govern-
ment problems of the immediate future. Cases which have already been
decided may show the direction which the law will take, and this study is
an attempt to ascertain that direction.
II.
THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF
SUBDIVISION REQUIREMENTS
Since money payments are only one of a large variety of subdivision
controls, they may not be considered in complete isolation. All subdivision
University. The Institute was founded in 1958 with a generous grant by the Home
Builders Association of Philadelphia and Suburbs to conduct research in the law
relating to home building and community development as an aid to local government
officials, home owners, the building industry and the general public.
1. For a comparison with other uses of conditions affecting builders, see Strine,
The Use of Conditions in Land-Use Control, 67 DicK. L. Riv. 109 (1963). On sub-
division control in general, see 6 POWXLL, REAL PROPSRT'Y § 866 (1958) ; 2 RATIIKOPF,
ZONING AND PLANNINd ch. 71 (3d ed. 1962) ; YOKLty, SUBDIVISIONS (1963) ; Anno.,
11 A.L.R.2d 524 (1950). For comparative analyses of subdivision legislation, see
Note, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1205 (1961) ; Note, 28 IND. L.J. 544 (1953) ; Note, 65 HARV.
L. REv. 1226 (1952).
2. The judgment of an administrative official should not be disturbed except
where it is arbitrary, tyrannical or unreasonable. McManus v. CAB, 310 F.2d 762
(2d Cir. 1962); Marathon Oil Co. v. Welch, 379 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 1963); Gulino
Constr. Corp. v. Hilleboe, 8 Misc. 2d 853, 167 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
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controls are of comparatively recent origin and owe their promulgation
to the recognition of municipal planners that the ground plan of any
American city tends to be no more than the composite of the subdivision
plans of many individual subdividers, formerly acting independently and
controlled only by anticipated market demand. The failure of developers
to coordinate their several plans with a comprehensive plan for the develop-
ment of the community could and did lead to haphazard growth, clogging
transportation and communication lines, unbalancing the community, and
providing for the eventual deterioration and blight which could be remedied
only by redevelopment. 3 Another problem which caused land subdivision
to become a matter of municipal concern arose when local governments,
enmeshed in the enthusiasm of land speculation, extended public improve-
ments into the newly proposed developments only to be left with additional
debt and no added revenue when speculators' bubbles burst in rapid
succession.4 It was because of this public loss that subdivision controls
were approved in the courts.
The statutory framework for subdivision controls was not born from
this experience, however, but traces its ancestry to earlier platting statutes,
which were originated to facilitate the conveyance of lands by reference
to the recorded plat, rather than by the more cumbersome method of
description by metes and bounds.5 Since it was already customary to
require a plat to be approved for accuracy before it could be admitted to
record, this afforded an appropriate point of control when the need for
more comprehensive regulation became apparent.6 The validity of a sub-
division map act is tested by the rules of law relating to the exercise of the
police power of the state. Reasonable regulation is permitted which is
related to the health, safety and welfare of the public.7 The municipalities,
not the purchasers of lots, are recognized as the principal beneficiaries of
the controls," and the legitimate interest of the municipalities in the utility
of land development and the maintenance of tax values is thought to
justify this type of regulation.9 Taken in this context, courts have viewed
the subdivision of land as a privilege to which conditions may properly
be attached.' 0
3. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 347-49 (1959) ; SEGot, LOCAL PLANNING ADMINIS-
TRATION 494 (1941); 2 RATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 71, at 71-3, 71-4
(3d ed. 1962).
4. HAAR, op. cit. supra note 3, at 350.
5. HAAR, op. cit. supra note 3, at 349-50; POWELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 94.
A subdivider can evade the statute, and consequently the imposition of conditions,
by dividing and disposing of fewer than the statutory minimum of lots (see infra
note 11), and conveying them by the metes and bounds method. But this practice
would be commercially impractical to the investment developer. Where the number
of lots will exceed the statutory minimum, metes and bounds conveyances to escape
the controls will not be permitted, and criminal penalties may be imposed if it is
attempted. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 22772 (Purdon Supp. 1962).
6. Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230, 234 (1960).
7. Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 11. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
8. Gordon v. Robinson Homes, Inc., 342 Mass. 529, 174 N.E.2d 381 (1961).
9. Stcog, op. cit. supra note 3, at 494-500.
10. Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
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Subdivision controls are invoked only when the proposed division of
land will bring a tract within the statutory definition of a subdivision, which
differs from state to state.'" In contrast with zoning, which only imposes
restrictions on the use of land, 12 subdivision controls may include positive
impositions and have been exercised to require the developer to install
public improvements on his land at his own expense.' 3 Among the require-
ments which have been imposed and upheld have been the dedication of
land for streets and the grading and paving thereof,14 the construction
of sewers,' 5 curbs, 16 gutters and other drainage facilities,' 7 parks and
playgrounds,' 8 a central sewage disposal plant, 19 and water mains.20
III.
LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON SUBDIVISION REQUIREMENTS
The power of local officials to impose conditions and to exact per-
formance before approval of a subdivision plan must be found in a valid
statute or an ordinance promulgated pursuant to such a statute.2' Sub-
division ordinances are usually enacted by the governing municipal body,22
but statutory authority is sometimes delegated to a local planning com-
mission.23 While in general the provisions of the statute control the
breadth of an ordinance, some courts have been willing to grant extensive
freedom of interpretation to the local governing body.2 4 On the other
11. The definition of a subdivision varies from state to state. The minimum
requirement is only that a parcel of land be divided into two or more lots. YOKLEY,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 4.
12. RHYNF, MUNICIPAL LAW 811 (1957).
13. As one illustration of the tremendous expense that can be involved, not neces-
sarily representing a maximum, a developer has been assessed fifty thousand dollars.
See City of Buena Park v. Boyar, 186 Cal. App. 2d 61, 8 Cal. Rptr. 674, (Dist. Ct.
App. 1960). A study in New Jersey showed that the developer installed 98% of the
street gradings, 96% of the pavements, 87% of the curbings, 85% of the storm drains,
and 83% of the water mains (among other utilities and improvements) in subdivisions.
It was not indicated whether the installations were voluntary or required. HAAR,
LAND-USE PLANNING 369 (1959).
14. Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
15. Allen v. Stockwell, 210 Mich. 488, 178 N.W. 27 (1920) ; Green Acres Bldg.
Corp. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 22 Misc. 2d 877, 197 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
16. Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 I11. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
17. Ibid.
18. In re Lake Secor Dev. Co., 141 Misc. 913, 252 N.Y. Supp. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
19. Medine v. Burns, 29 Misc. 2d 890, 208 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup. Ct. 1960) ; Gulino
Constr. Co. v. Hilleboe, 8 Misc. 2d 853, 167 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
20. Yardville Estates, Inc. v. City of Trenton, 66 N.J. Super. 51, 168 A.2d 429(1961) ; Zastrow v. Village of Brown Deer, 9 Wis. 2d 100, 100 N.W.2d 359 (1960).
21. Knutson v. State, 239 Ind. 656, 157 N.E.2d 469 (1959). The term ordinance,
as used here and throughout this comment, is meant to include all forms of local
regulations adopted through legislatively delegated authority, including planning
commission regulations and the like.
22. However, a subdivision ordinance may be enacted by initiative petition.
Mefford v. City of Tulare, 102 Cal. App. 2d 919, 228 P.2d 847 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
23. See YOKLXY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 28-39.
24. The usual rule is that cities take no power by implication, having only powers
expressly granted and those necessary to make effective the power expressly con-
ferred. Coronado Dev. Co. v. City of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174, 368 P.2d 51 (1962).
But California and Illinois appear willing to imply municipal powers. In Ayres v.
City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949), conditions were held to be lawful if
COMMENTS
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hand, the grant of power to control future development of the community
by subdivision control ordinances has been held to be an implied denial of
the power to control the same matters by other types of regulatory devices,
such as building permit applications. 25 Since the statutes generally may
be viewed as imposing conditions in derogation of common-law rights, they
should be strictly construed,26 but sometimes they carry provisions requir-
ing liberal construction. 27 In addition, the courts have accorded a presump-
tion of validity to any properly enacted statute or ordinance, which an in-
terested party must overcome clearly and affirmatively to be successful.2 8
A considerable body of case law has been accumulated adjudging
valid and invalid requirements compelling the builder to provide public
facilities. The leading opinion, (there being as yet no decision in the
United States Supreme Court) is generally acknowledged to be Ayres v.
City Council.2 9 There it was held that a person seeking to acquire the
advantages of subdivision has a duty to comply with "reasonable conditions
for design, dedication, improvement and restrictive use of the land so as
to conform to the safety and general welfare of the lot owners in the sub-
division and of the public. . .. -30 Later cases have cited Ayres as in-
dicating that the legality of a condition is to be judged by determining
whether the need for the requirement arises from the builder's activity,
or from general conditions and circumstances in the community as a
whole.3 ' The developer may be required to assume those costs which are
specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity and which would other-
wise be cast upon the public.32
When a developer is required to improve the site which he is sub-
dividing, it may be said that he is only being required to complete the
task which he has undertaken. This is to regard the dedication of streets,
grading and paving, and installing sewers as all part of a total process
whereby a cowpasture is converted into a building site.33 While this theory
has justified many impositions upon the builder, local communities have
they were not in actual conflict with the enabling act. It has since been stated that
the city has the power to supplement the enabling act, but not to materially alter it.
Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957). See also
Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Il. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956) (legislative
intent used to broadly interpret express delegation).
25. E.g., Reggs Homes, Inc. v. Dickerson, 16 Misc. 2d 732, 179 N.Y.S.2d 771
(Sup. Ct. 1958) (attempt to impose road building requirements and park fund pay-
ments on building permit approval rejected); Reid Dev. Corp. v. Parsippany-Troy
Hills Township, 10 N.J. 229, 89 A.2d 667 (1952) (attempt to control the size of lots
in a subdivision as a condition of extending water mains declared ultra vires).
26. See Coronado Dev. Co. v. City of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174, 368 P.2d
51 (1962).
27. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-2 (1940) ; Wis. STAT. § 236.45 (2) (b) (1959).
28. Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
29. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
30. 207 P.2d at 7.
31. Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230, 234 (1960).
32. Ibid. The California statute expressly provides that requirements must be
related to needs created by the subdivision. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 11510, 11525-26.
33. See cases cited supra notes 13, 16.
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attempted by a dubious extension of this rationalization to demand that
the developer provide every new facility, including parks34 and schools,
35
that the growing community will require, claiming that this is justified
by the population increase attributable to the activity of the subdivider-
builder.36  This effort has met with only mixed success, with the courts
distinguishing problems caused by the builder's activity from those which
may be said merely to be aggravated by it.3  Even this formulation fails
to note that the connection is specious, for new development is seldom
undertaken and is never successful, unless there is an existing demand for
new housing on the part of ready and willing consumers. This demand is
due not to the builder's activity, but to the location and desirability of
the community itself. If it is considered that the demand will be directly
related to the normal growth of the community, then it becomes more
difficult to justify requiring facilities, including parks and schools, not
related to the physical structure of the subdivision, since in most cases
the subdivision population will constitute only a portion of the total public
using such an improvement.
The problems which arise in fairly restricting the builder's duty to
alleviate conditions which are theoretically imputable to his activity might
well be resolved by reference to the law relating to special assessments.38
Those cases where the developer can be required to grade and pave streets
or provide sewers are also cases where the community could later under-
take the work and recover all, or substantially all, of the costs through
assessment.39 There is an advantage to the community in requiring the
34. In re Lake Secor Dev. Co., 141 Misc. 913, 252 N.Y. Supp. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
The attempt to require parks has met with only mixed success. Commentators have
favored it because the benefit from parks is frequently local. See Reps, Control of
Urban Land Subdivision, 14 SYRACUSE L. Rzv. 405, 410-11 (1963); Comment, 1961
Wis. L. Rxv. 310, 321-23. But see Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189,
82 A.2d 34 (1951), for a vigorous opinion condemning such an attempt as an un-
compensated exercise of the power of eminent domain.
35. The courts have not as yet found sufficient reason to uphold a dedication
requirement for school land. In Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount
Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961), the court conceded a need for the
land in question, but found that such need did not arise uniquely from the subdivision
itself and credited it to the total growth of the community. Under those circum-
stances, it was held that requiring the developer to pay the entire cost of remedying
the need amounted to an exercise of the power of eminent domain without compen-
sation. Even stronger in its terms is the dicta in Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Town-
ship of Madison, 68 N.J. Super. 197, 172 A.2d 40 (1961), to the effect that the cost
of public education may be met only by public taxation, and any requirement on a
developer directed to this end is a violation of his constitutional rights.
36. The effect of the prospective population growth on the existing community
facilities is not a legitimate consideration for the planning commission in approving
or disapproving a map. Beach v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 141 Conn. 79, 103 A.2d
814 (1954).
37. See notes 34, 35, supra.
38. This is suggested in Comment, 1961 Wis. L. Rev. 310, 321-23.
39. Special assessments have been levied to pay for practically all types of im-
provements which have been commonly made conditions of map approval. See
Browning v. Hooper, 269 U.S. 396, 46 S.Ct. 141 (1926) (streets) ; Craighill v.
Lambert, 168 U.S. 611, 18 S.Ct. 217 (1898) (park) ; Appeal of Dellaripa, 88 Conn.
565, 92 Atl. 116 (1914) (sewer system).
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work to be done during construction of the subdivision rather than later,
since additional costs of financing and collection can thus be avoided. The
power to levy special assessments for improvements depends upon the
degree of peculiar benefit to the landowners in the immediate vicinity of
the improvements; when the property assessed is peculiarly benefitted,
but there is also a substantial benefit to the general public, it is possible
to apportion the costs, raising only a portion by special assessment.4 0
When the circumstances are such that a special assessment for a particular
improvement would be permitted, but not for the entire cost, it would
obviously be unfair to circumvent the constitutional limitation on the
taxing power by requiring the developer to make the improvement solely
at his expense. It should be noted that the power to levy special assess-
ments is generally said to be based on the taxing power,4 1 but the power
to undertake public improvements is grounded on the duty to provide
for the public health, safety and general welfare under the police power,




LEGAL LIMITATION ON MONEY PAYMENT REQUIREMENTS
The principal argument in favor of the legality of money payment
demands is that they are in commutation of work which the developer could
have been required to do himself; in effect, that they are substitutionary
in character.43 If this is so and is taken literally as a limitation, it would
follow that payments could not be demanded where dedication and im-
provement by the builder could not be required. From the developer's
viewpoint, there are arguments against money payments even where the
work could be required. Dedication and improvement result in visible
additions to the property which he is offering for sale and may well en-
hance marketability, while in the case of a cash contribution the potential
buyer has nothing but a vague assurance of future benefits to spur his
desire to purchase, and no firm guarantee that he will not be assessed for
the improvements when they are undertaken.
If the money payments can be directed into other channels where they
can be used for general public purposes, the imposition is in reality a tax
which is not being assessed equally throughout the entire municipality;
it has therefore been held that unless the use of the funds collected is so
restricted that it must confer a direct benefit on the subdivision, the
40. Briscoe v. Rudolph, 221 U.S. 547, 31 S.Ct. 679 (1911); Mullins v. City of
Little Rock, 131 Ark. 59, 198 S.W. 262 (1917).
41. Village of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 19 S.Ct. 187 (1898).
42. Borough of Mt. Pleasant v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 138 Pa. 365, 20 Ati. 1052
(1891). See 48 AM. JUR. Special Assessments § 10 and cases cited in n.1l (1943).
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requirement is invalid because in essence it is a tax.44 The direct benefit
rule is an attempt to maintain a clear distinction between regulation under
the police power, assessment under the power to tax, and a taking under
the power of eminent domain-a distinction which has been by no means
obvious in the past.45 Claims that specific requirements for dedication or
improvements by the developer were but disguised exercises of the taxing
or eminent domain powers have been rejected in the past,48 only to be
raised anew in opposition to money payment requirements. Courts which
had been willing to imply the power to impose dedication and improve-
ment conditions47 have refused to find similar power when money pay-
ments were demanded. In a California case, Kelber v. City of Upland,45
the court declared invalid an ordinance which required the payment of
a certain sum per lot, part of the proceeds to be used for acquiring park
and school sites anywhere in the city and the residue to be placed in a
general drainage fund. The court was of the opinion that money payment
conditions might be imposed for the purpose of remedying needs of the
particular subdivision, or applied toward making proper connections be-
tween that subdivision and the surrounding area, but that when a condition
was imposed, for the purpose of helpitig to meet the future needs of an
entire city, the municipality had exceeded its power. Similarly, in an
Oregon case, 49 where the funds collected were to be used for "land acquisi-
tion" and there was nothing in the ordinance to relate the expenditure to
the subdivision, the court found that the primary purpose was to provide
general public benefits instead of completing the subdivider's work. The
ordinance was therefore held to contemplate a tax, a power which had not
been delegated to the municipality.
Money payment conditions must not be confused with fees legitimately
chargeable to a builder or developer to cover the cost of administration
in the granting of building permits, making inspections of work in progress,
and recording the plans, although when such fees greatly exceed the cost
of the services rendered, they must be judged on the same police power
44. Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957) ; Haugen
v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961); City of Buena Park v. Boyar, 186
Cal. App. 2d 61, 8 Cal. Rptr. 674 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960) ; Longridge Estates v. City
of Los Angeles, 183 Cal. App. 2d 533, 6 Cal. Rptr. 900 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960). See
also Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960).
45. There has always been a fear that the powers will tend to merge. Mr. Justice
Holmes, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158 (1922),
wrote confidently:
The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that
it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use
without compensation. A similar assumption is made in the decisions upon the
Fourteenth Amendment. . . . When this seemingly absolute protection is found
to be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to
extend the qualification more and more until at last private property disappears.
But that cannot be accomplished in this way under the Constitution of the United
States. Id. at 415, 43 S.Ct. 160.
46. See, e.g., Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956)
Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
47. See note 24, supra.
48. 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957).
49. Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961).
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standards as the money payment requirements." A city has the right,
pursuant to properly delegated authority, to exact a license tax on persons
carrying on the "business of acquiring, subdividing, improving, selling or
otherwise dealing in and disposing of real property." 51 But, in Newport
Bldg. Corp. v. City of Santa Ana,5 2 an ordinance imposing a business
license fee of fifty dollars per lot on subdividing alone, partially to cover
the outlay of capital for parks, recreation and fire protection, and a second
ordinance prohibiting the approval of a map until the business license tax
was paid for each lot were voided as an attempt to assert an unconstitu-
tional regulation in the guise of raising revenue.5 3 In distinguishing the
levy from a legitimate business tax, the court said:
If the ordinance had been so worded as to cover plaintiff's whole
operation of subdividing, improvement, construction and selling . ..
we could agree. Unfortunately, that was not done. The whole fee
procedure in the defendant's ordinance is indelibly tied to a regula-
tion whose field is already occupied by the Subdivision Map Act.
While we can conceive of the work of subdivision being separately
carried on for pay and therefore being classified as a business .. .
as here referred to, [it] involved only the preparatory expenditure
through which plaintiff might ultimately attract the public to buy.
Incidental only in plaintiff's operations, it did not here constitute
plaintiff's business. It constituted a useful part of plaintiff's whole
business of subdividing and selling.5 4
Where it has been shown that the funds collected will be used for the
direct benefit of the subdivision assessed, and that the sum is reasonable,
money payment requirements have been upheld. In City of Buena Park
v. Boyar,55 an assessment of fifty thousand dollars to be applied to the
construction of an off-site drainage ditch to serve the subdivision and
connect it with the city sewage relief channel was sustained despite the
objection that the ditch would serve other areas as well as that being
developed. After pointing out that the charge did not cover the entire
cost of constructing the ditch, the court reasoned that the subdivider could
have been required to construct the ditch himself, as it was essential to
the proper drainage of the subdivision, and that the funds could only be
spent on the one project. The court concluded that the requirement was
undoubtedly for the direct benefit of the subdivision in question when
considered in relation to it and the adjoining area. Similarly, an earlier
50. See Merelli v. City of St. Clair Shores, 355 Mich. 575, 96 N.W.2d 144
(1959); Daniels v. Borough of Point Pleasant, 23 N.J. 357, 129 A.2d 265 (1957).
51. City of Los Angeles v. Rancho Homes, Inc., 40 Cal. 2d 764, 256 P.2d
305 (1953).
52. 210 Cal. App. 2d 771, 26 Cal. Rptr. 797 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
53. Note the reversal of the usual objection against revenue raising through
regulation. See Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961). Under some
circumstances, an otherwise valid tax is not objectionable because it also incidentally
regulates. See Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 54 S.Ct. 599 (1934). See
also Annot., 81 L. Ed. 776 (1936).
54. 26 Cal. Rptr. 797, 800-01 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
55. 186 Cal. App. 2d 61, 8 Cal. Rptr. 674 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
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case56 upheld the right of a city to require payment of a reasonable charge
for connection to and use of sewer facilities located outside of the sub-
division, and to condition the approval of the subdivision map on payment
of the charge as a proper incident of the exercise of the police power. In
this case, the charge was based on a per acre assessment, and the money
was placed in a special trust fund for use exclusively in the construction
of outlet sewers. The court found no objection to the fact that the
funds were not specifically applied to the connection of the immediate
subdivision. 57 In both of the above cases it should be noted that the sums
charged were for facilities which, while not located on the land of the
subdivision itself, were proximate to it. The direct benefit to the sub-
division following from the construction of drainage and sewage facilities
could not be doubted, nor could it be disputed that the necessity for such
improvements was directly attributable to the builder's activity.
There is little difficulty in upholding a money payment condition
which is specifically directed to public improvements on the property being
subdivided, or when necessary to connect the subdivision with public
facilities in the surrounding area.58 The real test of the validity of the
requirement comes when the funds are earmarked for the acquisition of
land or construction of public improvements away from the site of the
particular subdivision and not necessary as a connector. In Gulest Asso-
ciates, Inc. v. Town of Newburgh,59 a state statute authorized the town
planning board to require the payment of determined amounts, in lieu of
dedicating land, when the board should find that a suitable park could
not be located in the plat. The money collected was to be used by the
town for purchasing property and facilities for recreational purposes in
the neighborhood. Regulations adopted pursuant to the act imposed the
payment of fifty dollars per lot into a special fund "for the future acquisi-
tion and/or improvement of recreational facilities in the town." The
developer challenged the act and the ordinance in a summary judgment
proceeding, in which the lower court held both pieces of legislation void
for failing to contain adequate limitations on the delegation of authority
and the use of the money. There was no discussion of the familiar pre-
sumption of constitutionality or other interpretive rules generally employed
to save legislation."0 On appeal, the Appellate Division issued a memo-
56. Longridge Estates v. City of Los Angeles, 183 Cal. App. 2d 533, 6 Cal. Rptr.
900 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
57. See Stanco v. Suozzi, 11 Misc. 2d 784, 171 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sup. Ct. 1958),
where a similar charge to be paid into a general sewage fund as a condition to a build-
ing permit was upheld. The fund was to be used only for making sewer connections,
and the charge was based on the approximated cost of making the connections. The
Longridge case has been criticized as a confusion of the reasonable relation to the
subdivision test with the power of eminent domain. Reps, Control of Urban Land
Subdivision, 14 SYRACUSp L. REv. 405, 407 n.11.
58. See text accompanying notes 48, 49, supra.
59. 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
60. See text accompanying note 28, supra. A statute should be interpreted in
such a manner as to preserve its constitutionality, if at all possible. Plymouth Coal
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 34 S.Ct. 359 (1914).
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randum opinion of only one sentence which nevertheless significantly
changed the decision: "We agree with the determination of Special Term
that the statute in question is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of
this case."6t (Emphasis added.) Presumably the reasoning of the court
in saving the statute was that an ordinance limiting the use of the funds
to the benefit of the subdivision would have been free from challenge, and
could also have been enacted under the authority of the same statute. The
statute, section 277 of the New York Town Law, had used the word
"neighborhood," but the regulations permitted acquisition of land in the
entire town. 62 Due to the lack of discussion, the case is of limited authority,
but it does indicate that money payment requirements for off-site, non-
connecting facilities are not void per se.
Since money payment requirements are substitutionary in character,
the nature of the public work for which the payments have been substi-
tuted will determine whether or not the requirement is within the power
of the municipality. 63 In general, improvements may be classed in three
categories: those which are located on the subdivision and may be said to
be a completion of the work begun by the developer, such as streets,
sewers and curbing; those which are located off-site, but are necessary to
connect public facilities on the site with those in the rest of the com-
munity, such as water and sewer lines and access roads; and those off-site
improvements which are not related physically to the subdivided tract,
including parks, playgrounds and schools. In the first two categories
direct benefit is demonstrable, but that is not true of improvements falling
in the third, which may benefit the general community as much as the
tract under development. There are two justifications for demanding a
cash equivalent for off-site improvements not necessary to complete the
work of the developer. The land in the subdivision may not be suitable,
or the subdivision may not be large enough to permit the taking of sufficient
ground. It will often prove more practical to apportion the cost of a
park or like community facility among several new and contiguous develop-
ments than to locate one small open area in each. If the common park
were close enough or accessible enough to be in fact a fair substitution for
one in each tract, this would be no more than a substitution for something
which the builder could be required to otherwise provide. In the case of
61. Gulest Associates v. Town of Newburgh, 15 App. Div. 2d 815, 225 N.Y.S.2d
538 (1962).
62. See Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957),
and text accompanying note 48, supra.
63. A number of cases have been decided on a simple finding that there was no
delegation of authority to make an assessment of money as a condition. Gordon v.
Village of Wayne, 370 Mich. 329, 121 N.W.2d 823 (1963) ; Coronado Dev. Co. v. City
of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174, 368 P.2d 51 (1962). It seems that an express delega-
tion in the enabling act may be necessary in those states which are unwilling to imply
municipal powers. See supra, note 24. Some statutes already specifically authorize
substitutionary money payments. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2829 (Supp. 1961); N.Y.
TowN LAW § 277. The Arkansas statute requires that the contribution "be used for
the acquisition of facilities that serve the subdivision." ARK. SvAT. ANN. § 19-2829
(Supp. 1961).
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a school, a facility generally financed by taxation,64 it cannot be said that
the builder should provide this type of public improvement, and money
payments for this purpose would not be a cash equivalent of something
the builder could be required to provide.
The more remote the off-site improvement, the greater the probability
that it is a community asset, rather than one peculiarly related to the sub-
division. To fairly alleviate this problem, it should be possible to apportion
the costs between the new development and the whole community, as is
done in the case of special assessments.6 5 The special assessment is valid
where there is some direct benefit to the assessed landowners as well as
a benefit to the community, and a fair standard of apportionment is used. 66
The principal difference between special assessment and the money pay-
ment condition would seem to be that the former is generally levied to pay
for land acquired or work undertaken by the public, while the latter
represents a present payment on behalf of the future landowners to pay
for similar facilities to be installed.
V.
CONCLUSION
In the future, it is believed that the courts will continue to test the
validity of money payment conditions from the standpoint of the proposed
disposition of the collected funds. If the imposition is in substitution for
something which the developer could have been required to furnish, land
or work, it will be upheld. Assuming that the developer may be required
to furnish public facilities which are made necessary by the improvement
of his land for building purposes, but not those which are made necessary
by the normal growth of the community, in those cases where benefits
to the general community are mingled with direct benefits to the subdivision
a fair standard of apportionment may serve to show that the community
is not trying to collect general revenue in the form of regulating land
development in order to avoid constitutional limitations on the taxing
power. Where the effect of regulation is not so much to insure an ade-
quately planned and coordinated growth of the community as to stem
the tide of a general population increase by closing off the supply of new
housing-a result that can be anticipated if building costs become pro-
hibitive-the courts should not be without power to intervene, notwith-
standing the presumptions in favor of the regularity of municipal action. 67
Michael B. Kean
64. See note 35, supra.
65. Reps, Control of Urban Land Subdivision, 14 SYRACUSE L. Rev. 405, 411-12(1963).
66. Hancock v. City of Muskogee, 250 U.S. 454, 39 S.Ct. 528 (1919) ; Briscoe v.
Rudolph, 221 U.S. 547, 31 S.Ct. 679 (1911).
67. See Mansfield & Swett, Inc. v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 198
Atl. 225 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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